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1680 
Article 
Disappearing Districts: Minority Vote 
Dilution Doctrine as Politics 
Terry Smith† 
Minority vote dilution doctrine is once again under stress. 
Decades after the Supreme Court eviscerated Constitution-
based approaches to redressing minority vote dilution under 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,1 Congress’s statu-
tory response, amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965,2 is similarly endangered. The forces that beset section 2 
and minority vote dilution doctrine are both demographic and 
doctrinal. In demographic terms, certain types of majority-
minority districts, namely majority-black ones, are becoming 
more difficult to create or maintain because of black population 
dispersal,3 the atrophy of total population in historically black 
districts, and the relatively high percentage of blacks who are 
not of voting age.4 The doctrinal problem is in part an out-
growth of these trends. In Pender County v. Bartlett, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court held that when a state creates a dis-
trict pursuant to section 2, the minority group for whom the 
district is created must constitute a majority of the voting-age 
population in the remedial district.5 
The North Carolina court’s decision was premised primari-
ly on statutory interpretation and stare decisis rather than a 
rigorous theory of vote dilution.6 Yet the constricted prism 
 
†  Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. Copyright © 2009 by Terry 
Smith. 
 1. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76–78 (1980). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1973–1973bb (2000)). 
 3. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 n.11 (1986).  
 4. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 499 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 5. 649 S.E.2d 364, 372 (N.C. 2007), aff ’d sub nom. Bartlett v. Strickland, 
129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009). 
 6. See id. at 370–72 (relying on the “plain language of Section 2” and the 
fact that “the majority of federal circuit courts confronting the question have 
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through which the court viewed the issue belies several broader 
implications of the case. First, the court’s numerosity require-
ment exacerbates questionable judicial distinctions between 
qualitative vote dilution claims (such as minority vote dilution) 
and quantitative claims (such as one person, one vote). The lat-
ter claims are typically based on equality of population general-
ly, not equal numbers of voting-age citizens.7 
Second, because North Carolina had demonstrated that 
black voters in the at-issue district could elect the candidate of 
their choice as a plurality with the aid of white crossover votes, 
the North Carolina Supreme Court effectively imposed on sec-
tion 2 an unconstitutional requirement that the state overuse 
race.8 In Shaw v. Reno and its progeny, the United States Su-
preme Court voided several majority-minority congressional 
districts that it found were created principally on the basis of 
race without compelling justification.9 If a state may violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment by creating too many black districts 
without justification, it may also violate the Constitution by 
overaggregating or packing blacks in a single district. 
Third, Pender County is cautionary because North Carolina 
acted of its own accord in creating the section 2 district at is-
sue.10 In confining the legislature’s ability to address minority 
vote dilution only to circumstances where the minority could be 
a voting-age majority,11 the North Carolina Supreme Court li-
mited the use of the Voting Rights Act as a justification for 
preemptive remediation. Yet in constitutional cases involving 
the Fourteenth Amendment—including voting cases—the 
United States Supreme Court has afforded states latitude to 
remedy racial underrepresentation and other concerns. Pender 
County renders it more difficult for states to preemptively ad-
dress minority vote dilution under section 2 than other forms of 
racial underrepresentation under the Constitution itself. This 
outcome is particularly untoward because section 2 was 
 
concluded that, when a district must be created pursuant to Section 2, it must 
be a majority-minority district”). 
 7. See, e.g., Moore v. Itawamba County, Miss., 431 F.3d 257, 259–60 (5th 
Cir. 2005) (finding a violation of the Equal Protection Clause based on general 
population deviation); Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1219–21 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(same). 
 8. Pender County, 649 S.E.2d at 366–67. 
 9. 509 U.S. 630, 641–42 (1993). 
 10. Pender County, 649 S.E.2d at 366. 
 11. Id. at 372. 
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amended in 1982 to avert the difficulties of bringing constitu-
tional vote dilution claims.12 
Finally, the very question of whether a minority must be 
capable of numbering a voting-age majority in a district before 
it is entitled to representation is a puzzling query if one substi-
tutes any other interest group (for example, gun owners) for the 
term “minority.” The court in Pender County misconceived mi-
norities as distinct from other interest groups regarding a cha-
racteristic on which they are quite similar. An interest-group or 
coalition conception of minority voters would not deploy their 
lack of voting-age numerosity to deprive them of representa-
tion. Interest groups are concerned foremost with their candi-
dates and issues prevailing.13 Their majority status, voting age 
or otherwise, is a concern only to the extent it is a necessary 
precondition to their candidates or issues winning. Thus, Pend-
er County treats minority voters as exceptional in the district-
ing process in much the same way as the Supreme Court 
treated them as aberrational in Shaw v. Reno and its progeny. 
These courts have simply shown an inability to graft minorities 
onto the prevailing two-party, interest-group structure of poli-
tics and to treat them similarly to other groups when they are 
similar and differently when they are different. The effect of 
this judicial confusion is twofold. First, it discriminates against 
minority voters. Second, it creates further inconsistency be-
tween the Supreme Court’s recognition of states’ interest in a 
stable, party-based political system on the one hand and the 
role of minorities in that system on the other. 
Below, after discussing why black districts are disappear-
ing, I amplify each of these arguments. I offer these contentions 
not as an endorsement of coalition districts as the preferred 
type of remedial district under section 2, but rather as a way of 
reconciling section 2 jurisprudence with other relevant dimen-
sions of the Supreme Court’s ballot-box jurisprudence. Politics 
happens on the ground, where the Court’s rulings on electoral 
politics must necessarily interact with each other, laying bare 
inconsistencies. Pender County must be evaluated in this larger 
context. 
 
 12. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1973–1973bb (2000)). 
 13. But see Richard Briffault, Ballot Propositions and Campaign Finance 
Reform, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 413, 426 n.64 (“In candidate elections, many 
interests [sic] groups are concerned less with which candidate wins and more 
with having access to the ultimate winner once he or she takes office.”). 
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I.  PENDER COUNTY AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHALLENGE TO MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICTS   
Pender County v. Bartlett is an atypical section 2 lawsuit. 
The State of North Carolina was sued not for its failure to 
create a remedial district under section 2, but rather for its 
preemptive creation of such a district.14 The plaintiffs, Pender 
County and five of its county commissioners, contended in their 
suit that North Carolina had violated a state constitutional 
prohibition on the splitting of counties (the Whole County Pro-
vision) in the creation of State House District 18.15 North Caro-
lina defended on the ground that the creation of District 18 was 
mandated by section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which 
forbids “denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the 
United States to vote on account of race or color.”16 Section 2 
measures denial or abridgment based on whether a protected 
group enjoys an equal opportunity to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of its choice.17 House Dis-
trict 18, however, did not reflect the traditionally preferred re-
medy for a section 2 violation—the creation of a majority-
minority district.18 Instead, District 18 consisted of “a total 
African-American population of 42.89 percent, and an African-
American voting age population of 39.36 percent.”19 Prior North 
Carolina elections had shown that legislative districts with a 
black population of at least 41.54 percent and a black voting 
age population of at least 38.37 percent would afford blacks, 
consistent with section 2’s command, the ability to elect their 
preferred candidate.20 District 18 fell within these parame-
ters.21  
Much of the North Carolina court’s attention focused on 
Thornburg v. Gingles,22 the earliest United States Supreme 
 
 14. Pender County, 649 S.E.2d at 365–66. 
 15. Id. at 367. 
 16. Id. at 367–68 (quoting Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). 
 18. Terry Smith, Reinventing Black Politics: Senate Districts, Minority 
Vote Dilution and the Preservation of the Second Reconstruction, 25 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 277, 289 (1998) (“While not required under the Act, the remedy of 
choice for section 2 violations has become the creation of majority-minority 
single-member districts.”). 
 19. Pender County, 649 S.E.2d at 374. 
 20. Id. at 380. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. at 378–79. 
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Court case interpreting amended section 2.23 In Gingles, the 
United States Supreme Court set forth three preconditions for 
a successful vote dilution claim under section 2: 
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is suffi-
ciently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a 
single-member district. . . . Second, the minority group must be able 
to show that it is politically cohesive . . . . Third, the minority must be 
able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a 
bloc to enable it—in the absence of special circumstances, such as the 
minority candidate running unopposed—usually to defeat the minori-
ty’s preferred candidate.24 
Although the Court in Gingles expressly declined to apply 
its preconditions to cases such as Pender County, where the 
minority group does not constitute a majority in the section 2 
district,25 the plaintiffs in Pender County argued that section 2 
does not require the creation of a remedial district where the 
protected group for whom it is created would not constitute a 
voting-age majority in the new district.26 
The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed.27 The court 
first observed that there was no reason why the numerosity re-
quirement of Gingles should not also apply in the case before it, 
even though Gingles involved a challenge to a multi-member 
district, whereas Pender County was challenging the creation 
of a single-member district.28 The court next noted that a ma-
jority of federal circuits have required a section 2 remedial dis-
trict to consist of a majority of voting-age citizens of the pro-
tected group.29 It found these cases availing because:  
If a minority group lacks the voting population “to independently de-
cide the outcome of an election,” it cannot demonstrate that its voting 
strength has been diluted in violation of Section 2 because it cannot 
show that any electoral structure or practice has thwarted its ability 
or potential to elect candidates of its choice.30 
Finally, the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that 
a voting-age majority requirement creates a judicially manage-
able standard that can “be applied fairly, equally, and consis-
 
 23. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 34 (1986). 
 24. Id. at 50–51 (citation omitted). 
 25. Id. at 46 n.12. 
 26. Pender County, 649 S.E.2d at 371. 
 27. Id. at 372. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 372–73 (quoting Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 429 (4th Cir. 
2004)). 
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tently throughout the redistricting process,” and should make 
litigation more predictable and less frequent.”31 
House District 18 exemplifies a coalition district. Coalition 
districts are electoral units in which a racial minority does not 
constitute a majority of the voters but is nevertheless able to 
elect the candidate of its choice because of the crossover votes of 
sympathetic whites.32 These districts pose two problems in the 
representation of minority interests. First, they may adversely 
affect the substantive representation of minorities by inhibiting 
the racial liberality of the representative elected from such a 
district.33 Second, they may redouble a minority group’s focus 
on race because the minority is required to be especially cohe-
sive if it is to elect the candidate of its choice in a district in 
which it is not the majority.34 
Notwithstanding these concerns, coalition districts may be 
necessary if vote dilution doctrine is to have continuing vitality 
in the face of demographic trends. Of the forty-two members of 
the Congressional Black Caucus, only twenty-one hail from dis-
tricts that contain a black-majority, voting-age population.35 
Thus, section 2 litigation regarding the remaining districts 
would face a substantial hurdle were courts to impose a voting-
age majority requirement.36 Part of the difficulty in maintain-
ing or creating districts with black voting-age majorities stems 
from the relative youth of the black population. According to 
the 2000 Census, while only 23.5 percent of the white popula-
 
 31. Id. at 373 (“Without a majority requirement, each legislative district is 
exposed to a potential legal challenge by a numerically modest minority group 
with claims that its voting power has been diluted and that a district therefore 
must be configured to give it control over the election of candidates.”). 
 32. Terry Smith, Autonomy Versus Equality: Voting Rights Rediscovered, 
57 ALA. L. REV. 261, 293 (2005). Sometimes courts distinguish between cros-
sover and coalition districts depending upon whether minority voters join with 
another minority group or a faction of the majority voting group to achieve an 
effective majority. See, e.g., Pender County, 649 S.E.2d at 371.  
 33. Smith, supra note 32, at 293–94. 
 34. Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 
734, 798 (2008). 
 35. U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 110 Congression-
al District Summary File (2007), http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ 
DatasetMainPageServlet (referring to data compiled using table “District by 
Race for Persons 18 Years or Older”). 
 36. The non-retrogression mandate of section 5 would protect the exis-
tence of these districts if they are located in a covered jurisdiction and if sec-
tion 5 did not similarly look solely to the voting-age population as its measure 
of non-retrogression. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000). 
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tion is below the voting age of eighteen,37 nearly one-third (31.4 
percent) of the black population is below the voting age.38 Ma-
jority-black congressional districts were also among those los-
ing the greatest overall population between 2000 and 2007. Of 
the twenty-five congressional districts experiencing the great-
est population decreases during this period, nine are majority-
black and thirteen are represented by blacks.39 In addition to 
necessitating that surrounding populations be adjoined to these 
districts at the next decennial reapportionment, these popula-
tion decreases portend difficulty in maintaining a black-
majority district if the adjoining areas are not also predomi-
nantly black. 
The Pender County court did not weigh these national de-
mographic realities or the specific trends in North Carolina be-
fore holding that section 2 required the minority group to con-
stitute a voting-age majority in a remedial district. Yet these 
trends may render it difficult to satisfy the court’s numerosity 
requirement even when vote dilution is present and the need 
for a remedy is otherwise demonstrable. In this regard, the 
Pender County court was faced with a choice between allowing 
demographics to dictate vote dilution doctrine and calibrating 
vote dilution doctrine to account for demographic realities. 
II.  ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE UNEQUAL 
DEMANDS OF QUALITATIVE VOTE DILUTION CLAIMS   
In opting to allow demographics to dictate vote dilution 
doctrine, the court eschewed reference to quantitative vote di-
lution claims, which likely would have directed it to the oppo-
site conclusion. Although the United States Supreme Court’s 
one-person, one-vote jurisprudence has long elided difficult 
questions about the relevant population for determining 
whether districts are equipopulous,40 the Court appears to have 
 
 37. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHITE POPULATION, BY AGE AND SEX FOR THE 
UNITED STATES: 2000 (2002), http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/ 
briefs/phc-t8/tables/tab02.pdf.  
 38. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, BLACK OR AFRICAN AMERICAN POPULATION, BY 
AGE AND SEX FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2000 (2002), http://www.census.gov/ 
population/www/cen2000/briefs/phc-t8/tables/tab03.pdf. 
 39. Swing State Project, Population Change by Congressional District, 
Sept. 3, 2008, http://www.swingstateproject.com/showDiary.do?diaryId=2952 
(ranking the congressional districts with the greatest population losses be-
tween 2000 and 2007). 
 40. See, e.g., Chen v. City of Houston, 532 U.S. 1046, 1047 (2001) (Tho-
mas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“Having read the Equal Pro-
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settled on total population as an acceptable metric (rather 
than, for example, voting-age population or registered voters).41 
In treating section 2 remedial districts as sui generis, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court continued a pattern of imposing more 
stringent requirements on qualitative vote dilution claims than 
quantitative vote dilution claims.42 The result is to substantial-
ly defeat the point of providing a statutory alternative to con-
stitutional vote dilution claims. 
Courts do not recognize a unitary standard for constitu-
tional vote dilution claims.43 The typical quantitative claim is 
relatively straightforward.44 A state’s failure to adhere to equal 
population standards requires it to justify its deviation.45 The 
plaintiff ’s burden is minimal—it simply points out the absence 
of adherence to equipopulation principles.46  
In contrast, a plaintiff who alleges racial vote dilution in 
violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments must 
show discriminatory intent, which means more than mere ac-
quiescence by a decision maker in the harmful effects of a redi-
stricting plan.47 But despite these different evidentiary bur-
dens, the plaintiffs in both quantitative and qualitative vote 
dilution suits suffer a similar type of harm: debasement of the 
right to vote (albeit based on different characteristics).48 
 
tection Clause to include a ‘one-person, one-vote’ requirement, and having pre-
scribed population variance that, without additional evidence, often will satis-
fy the requirement, we have left a critical variable in the requirement unde-
fined. We have never determined the relevant ‘population’ that States and 
localities must equally distribute among their districts.”). 
 41. Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise of One Person, One Vote, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 213, 232 (2003). 
 42. Barbara Y. Phillips, Reconsidering Reynolds v. Sims: The Relevance of 
Its Basic Standard of Equality to Other Vote Dilution Claims, 38 HOW. L.J. 
561, 575–80 (1995). 
 43. Id. at 561–62. 
 44. See id. (comparing the judicial approaches to qualitative and quantita-
tive vote dilution claims). 
 45. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964). 
 46. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730–31 (1983) (stating that the 
plaintiff must show “the population differences among districts could have 
been reduced or eliminated altogether by a good-faith effort to draw districts of 
equal population”). 
 47. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 70 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
 48. Phillips, supra note 42, at 581–82 (“The starting point of the rational 
approach to vote dilution issues must be that a member of a racial faction has 
the same right to effective participation in political life as promised to whites 
in Reynolds . . . .”). 
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The different treatment of constitutional quantitative and 
qualitative claims, namely the imposition of a discriminatory 
intent requirement on the latter, led to the amending of section 
2 in 1982 to create a disparate impact standard and ease the 
prosecution of minority vote dilution claims.49 With its voting-
age-majority-minority requirement, the Pender County court 
perpetuated undue distinctions between quantitative and qua-
litative claims, but this time under section 2 instead of the 
Constitution. Ironically, vote dilution claims under section 2 
may become more difficult to bring because courts refuse to ab-
ide by the practice of relying on total population, instead of vot-
ing-age population, in one person, one vote claims. Thus, the 
salutary effects of escaping the intent requirements of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments have been excised by 
declining to apply other constitutional norms. 
III.  SHAW ’S SHADOW   
Although unusual because it required the defendant state, 
rather than the plaintiffs, to prove the preconditions of Thorn-
burg v. Gingles,50 the posture of Pender County was otherwise 
similar to a series of racial gerrymandering cases the Supreme 
Court entertained throughout the 1990s, beginning with Shaw 
v. Reno.51 In each case, states allegedly created majority-
minority congressional districts primarily on the basis of race 
and defended them by citing sections 2 and 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965.52 North Carolina’s burden of proof in Pender 
County was measured against section 2 and the state constitu-
tion’s prohibition on splitting counties.53 The Shaw cases impli-
cated vote dilution under section 2 and non-retrogression under 
section 5, requiring states to demonstrate that these provisions 
 
 49. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 (1986) (“The intent test was re-
pudiated for three principal reasons—it is unnecessarily divisive because it 
involves charges of racism on the part of individual officials or entire commun-
ities, it places an inordinately difficult burden of proof on plaintiffs, and it 
asks the wrong question.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 50. Id. at 46. 
 51. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 52. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 85 (1997) (asserting sections 2 and 5 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as a defense to a claim of unconstitutional ra-
cial gerrymandering); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 976 (1996) (plurality opi-
nion) (pointing to section 2 and section 5 for justification); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 
U.S. 899, 911 (1996) (arguing that compliance with section 2 and section 5 is a 
compelling state interest). 
 53. Pender County v. Bartlett, 649 S.E.2d 364, 366 (N.C. 2007), aff ’d sub 
nom. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009). 
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necessitated the drawing of irregular lines to create majority-
minority districts.54 The Shaw cases, however, centered on the 
states’ alleged overuse of race—their proverbial segregation of 
the races in redistricting.55 Pender County, on the contrary, 
asked whether states could provide a remedy at all, if that re-
medy was something less than a majority-minority district.  
The essence of a claim under Shaw v. Reno is that a state, 
without compelling justification, has permitted race to predo-
minate in its redistricting decisions by subordinating tradition-
al districting criteria.56 If the Fourteenth Amendment con-
strains states’ use of race in redistricting, Shaw clashes with a 
requirement under section 2 that states create nothing less 
than a majority-voting-age-minority district where a lesser 
number might suffice. Coalition formation is a bedrock prin-
ciple of politics in general and districting in particular.57 Be-
cause North Carolina had demonstrated that racially polarized 
voting could be sufficiently contained to permit a limited coali-
tion between blacks and certain white voters, the Pender Coun-
ty court’s insistence on a majority-black district58 subordinated 
a traditional districting criterion to race. In essence, the court 
eliminated the opportunity for black voters to participate in 
normal politics merely because they could not constitute a ra-
cial majority in a putative district. 
In addition to creating constitutional concerns under 
Shaw, the North Carolina court’s interpretation pits section 2 
against itself. Section 2 not only ensures that minorities have 
an equal opportunity “to elect representatives of their choice,” 
but also that they can equally “participate in the political 
process.”59 Although section 2 does not define “opportunity . . . 
to participate in the political process,” the term cannot be read 
 
 54. Abrams, 521 U.S. at 85; Bush, 517 U.S. at 976; Shaw, 517 U.S. at 911. 
 55. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647 (“A reapportionment plan that includes in one 
district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely 
separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in 
common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable 
resemblance to political apartheid.”). 
 56. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (“The plaintiff ’s burden is 
to show, either through circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape and de-
mographics or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was 
the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a signifi-
cant number of voters within or without a particular district.”). 
 57. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482 (2003); infra Part IV. 
 58. Pender County, 649 S.E.2d at 371−72. 
 59. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1973−1973bb (2000)). 
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as redundant of electoral opportunity and includes the panoply 
of activities for achieving political goals, including dialogue, 
lobbying and coalition-building.60 The formation of coalitions, 
where they are not otherwise unfeasible because of racially po-
larized voting, certainly constitutes protected participation in 
the political process. The North Carolina court interprets sec-
tion 2’s protection of minorities’ equal opportunity to elect at 
the expense of derogating their equal opportunity to participate 
in the political process.  
Setting to one side concerns with the subordination of tra-
ditional districting criteria, Shaw and its progeny are predi-
cated on the broader harms caused by the overuse of race in 
districting, namely, racial stereotyping.61 If a state may inflict 
this harm by adjoining what the Supreme Court concluded 
were unrelated communities of color for purposes of maximiz-
ing the number of black congressional districts,62 it is difficult 
to see why a racial group is not similarly harmed when it is 
overaggregated into a single district. Pender County requires 
this type of packing,63 regardless of whether it is needed to nul-
lify the effects of racially polarized voting.  
The Shaw cases are factually but not analytically distin-
guishable from the excess use of race imposed by the Pender 
County court’s numerosity requirement. North Carolina abro-
gated a state constitutional requirement of not dividing coun-
ties in order to comply with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, a 
provision which the United States Supreme Court has assumed 
without deciding would be a compelling state interest in its ra-
cial gerrymandering cases.64 The Supreme Court has admo-
nished, however, that states’ efforts to comply with section 2 
will abridge the Equal Protection Clause if race is used gratuit-
 
 60. Kathryn Abrams, ‘Raising Politics Up’: Minority Political Participa-
tion and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 452−53 
(1988).  
 61. Miller, 515 U.S. at 920 (“[W]here the State assumes from a group of 
voters’ race that they think alike, share the same political interests, and will 
prefer the same candidates at the polls, it engages in racial stereotyping at 
odds with equal protection mandates.”) (internal quotations omitted). I have 
rejected as fictional the injury asserted by the white plaintiffs in Shaw. See 
Terry Smith, A Black Party? Timmons, Black Backlash and the Endangered 
Two-Part Paradigm, 48 DUKE L.J. 1, 44−51 (1998). I do not here ascribe to the 
Court’s reasoning but simply apply it to the section 2 context. 
 62. See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 920. 
 63. Pender County, 649 S.E.2d at 371−72. 
 64. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) (plurality opinion). 
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ously.65 In Bush v. Vera, the Court rejected Texas’s attempt to 
invoke section 2 as a defense to a claim that certain of its con-
gressional districts had been drawn principally on grounds of 
race. According to the Court, nothing in section 2 required the 
drawing of irregular district lines connecting dispersed minori-
ty populations.66 Like Pender County, the focus of Bush was the 
first Gingles precondition that a minority group be sufficiently 
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a 
single-member district.67 Unlike Pender County, however, the 
Bush Court’s focus was on geographic compactness68 rather 
than numerosity. Bush’s insistence on geographic compactness 
complemented, and was purportedly integral to, its vigilance of 
the gratuitous use of race. The North Carolina Supreme Court’s 
numerosity requirement, on the other hand, did not advance 
that constitutional interest, and indeed augmented the role of 
race for its own sake.69 
IV.  RACE AND PREEMPTIVE REMEDIATION   
The preemptive posture of Pender County poses a larger 
question of whether a state’s burden of proof for the creation of 
a remedial district is the same as a plaintiff ’s burden if the 
state were sued for failing to create such a district. The Su-
preme Court has generally recognized three bases for the 
preemptive creation of a remedial minority-enhanced district: 
(1) compliance with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act;70 (2) 
compliance with section 5 of the Voting Rights Act;71 and (3) 
remedying past or present discrimination.72 With respect to the 
section 2 justification, in lieu of imposing the technical eviden-
tiary standards that a plaintiff must meet, the Court has ac-
 
 65. Id. at 979 (“[T]he district drawn in order to satisfy § 2 must not subor-
dinate traditional districting principles to race substantially more than is ‘rea-
sonably necessary’ to avoid § 2 liability.”). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Were a state to mandate the same gratuitous use of race in, for in-
stance, the assignment of students to secondary or elementary schools, there is 
now little question that such a plan would violate the Fourteenth Amendment 
in the absence of compelling justification. Parents Involved in Comm. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2753−54 (2007) (declaring unconsti-
tutional school districts’ student-assignment systems that made the race of the 
student “determinative standing alone”). 
 70. Bush, 517 U.S. at 976. 
 71. Id. at 982−83. 
 72. Id. at 981. 
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corded states deference, requiring only “a strong basis in evi-
dence”73 and emphasizing that “the States retain a flexibility 
that federal courts enforcing § 2 lack, . . . insofar as deference is 
due to their reasonable fears of, and to their reasonable efforts 
to avoid, § 2 liability.”74 Thus, one could argue that North Caro-
lina’s decision to create a voting-age black plurality district 
need not adhere to the strict letter of section 2 in the absence of 
a clear prohibition on its interpretation of section 2’s numerosi-
ty requirement.  
But the posture of the case lends itself to a still bolder 
proposition about preemptive remediation by states in redi-
stricting. Although there is little doubt that the Supreme Court 
has been reluctant to allow race-based state action, “not every 
decision influenced by race is equally objectionable . . . .”75 
Thus, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the University of Michigan’s Law 
School admissions program, which used race as an ingredient 
in evaluating applicants, survived strict scrutiny because it was 
narrowly tailored toward furthering the compelling interest of 
ensuring a diverse student body and the educational benefits 
that flow therefrom.76 In so holding, the Court afforded the 
state a measure of deference because the Law School was in the 
best position to know the benefits of student diversity:  
The Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity is essen-
tial to its educational mission is one to which we defer . . . . Our scru-
tiny of the interest asserted by the Law School is no less strict for tak-
ing into account complex educational judgments in an area that lies 
primarily within the expertise of the university. Our holding today is 
in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a uni-
versity’s academic decisions . . . .77 
Similarly, in the Supreme Court’s most recent school as-
signment case, the Court ultimately rejected Seattle’s system 
for assigning students to secondary schools as overly race-
based. Justice Kennedy’s pivotal fifth vote in a concurring opi-
nion acknowledged that “[i]n the administration of public 
schools by the state and local authorities it is permissible to 
consider the racial makeup of schools and to adopt general poli-
cies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which is 
its racial composition.”78 
 
 73. Id. at 979. 
 74. Id. at 978. 
 75. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003). 
 76. Id. at 328−29. 
 77. Id. at 328. 
 78. Parents Involved in Comm. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 
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States do not have a less compelling interest in achieving 
diversity in their representative bodies than in their education-
al systems.79 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act has been one 
vehicle for achieving this diversity. It should not be easier for 
states to act preemptively under the Constitution to effectuate 
diversity in the classroom than it is for them to proactively re-
medy vote dilution under section 2, which was amended to 
avoid the difficulties in bringing constitutional vote dilution 
claims.80 Instead, the deference accorded states in other con-
texts, such as diversity in education,81 should be accorded them 
in the preemptive use of section 2. This deference would be con-
sistent with the Supreme Court’s “longstanding recognition of 
the importance in our federal system of each State’s sovereign 
interest in implementing its redistricting plan.”82 
V.  STRONG PARTIES, STRONG INTEREST GROUPS, 
COALITION DISTRICTS   
I begin this Part by reprising a heuristic from an article in 
which I argued that the Supreme Court’s racial gerrymander-
ing jurisprudence undercut its two-party jurisprudence by mak-
ing it unduly difficult for African Americans to enjoy the ordi-
nary prerequisites of their party fealty, including districts 
drawn to elect the candidate of their choice.83 Gratuitous race 
exceptionalism in section 2 vote dilution doctrine works a com-
parable harm to states’ interest in stable party government—
an interest recognized as important by the Supreme Court.84 
Suppose members of the Christian Conservative Coalition in Georgia 
began flexing their growing political muscle. Coalition members are 
overwhelmingly white and Republican, although they tend to out-
flank Republicans on the right of certain issues. Principal among 
these is abortion . . . . Frustrated that fellow Republicans rarely go 
 
2738, 2792 (2007). 
 79. A central reason for finding diversity to be a compelling interest in the 
educational context was the need “to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy 
in the eyes of the citizenry.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332. According to the Court, 
to achieve this legitimacy, “the path to leadership [must] be visibly open to ta-
lented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.” Id. It is difficult 
to exclude these considerations from the make-up of a body of officials elected 
to be responsive to myriad societal concerns. 
 80. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 976 (1996) (plurality opinion) (discuss-
ing the addition of the results test). 
 81. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328−29. 
 82. Bush, 517 U.S. at 952, 978. 
 83. Smith, supra note 61, at 4. 
 84. Id. at 9−15. 
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the distance in espousing the Coalition’s views on abortion, the lea-
dership of the Coalition threatens Republican members of the Geor-
gia Assembly that if they do not create a congressional district favor-
ing the election of Ron Davis, a popular Republican state legislator 
who has been a fervent advocate of the Coalition’s agenda, the Coali-
tion will actively encourage its members to sit out the next election, 
which would deprive Republicans of much-needed conservative 
votes . . . . Since major parties can gerrymander to achieve a roughly 
proportional allocation of seats between themselves, there is no rea-
son to believe that they cannot gerrymander to maintain an electoral 
coalition that is critical to the party’s success at the polls.85 
As the hypothetical underscores, American two-party poli-
tics is coalitional in nature. If Republicans in Georgia respond-
ed to the Christian Coalition’s request by insisting that no dis-
trict could be created on their behalf because they were not a 
voting-age majority in the relevant geographic area, it would be 
difficult for Republicans to perpetuate their party. Moreover, it 
would be difficult for the state of Georgia to further what the 
Supreme Court has recognized as an important interest in 
“preserv[ing] the political parties as viable and identifiable in-
terest groups.”86 Racial minorities are, of course, a racial group, 
but within the electoral process they are likewise an interest 
group.87 Although the Supreme Court has been remarkably in-
consistent in aligning blacks between these categories,88 it has 
permitted race to be used in furtherance of partisan gerryman-
dering.89 Moreover, political parties themselves have seized 
section 2’s non-dilution mandate for partisan gain.90 Thus, al-
though section 2 is written as a protection of the right to vote 
for racial and language groups, it is also fundamentally a sta-
tute about interest-group, two-party politics, for that is the con-
text in which the statute’s protections must operate.  
Imposing a numerosity requirement on racial minorities 
when no such requirement exists for the Christian Coalition 
discriminates against racial minorities. The requirement de-
prives them of the right to form the very coalitions that are the 
 
 85. Id. at 23−24. 
 86. Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 585 (2005). 
 87. Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 
CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1223 (1996) (noting the impossibility of distinguishing race 
from party affiliation as an explanation of black voting behavior). 
 88. Smith, supra note 32, at 281–89. 
 89. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 258 (2001). 
 90. Pamela S. Karlan, The Right to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formal-
ism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1734−35 (1993) (discussing Republican attempts to 
maximize majority-minority legislative districts in order to convert Democratic 
districts dependent on black-white coalitions). 
SMITH_4FMT 4/18/2009 2:37 PM 
2009] MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 1695 
 
core of stable party government. In so doing, it prevents the 
Supreme Court’s ballot-box jurisprudence from operating as an 
integrated whole, because it is difficult for states to foster vi-
brant political parties if Democrats must consistently apply 
constraints to their black constituencies that Republicans are 
not compelled to apply to their primarily white constituencies, 
such as the putative Christian Coalition. The exceptional 
treatment of minorities in the districting process is justifiable 
where racial bloc voting in conjunction with other historical 
and socioeconomic circumstances precludes cross-racial coali-
tions, or where such a coalition may elect a minority candidate 
that is not the minority-preferred candidate.91 North Carolina, 
however, had demonstrated the probability that a black plural-
ity would be able to elect the candidate of its choice with the aid 
of white crossover votes. Requiring more than a plurality for no 
other reason than the race of the interest group for whom the 
district is created elevates section 2 above the very fray in 
which it was intended to function—politics.  
  CONCLUSION   
I have devoted this Article largely to highlighting the doc-
trinal inconsistencies that ensue from treating minorities diffe-
rently from other interest groups under section 2 when no rele-
vant distinctions exist. There remains the statutory question 
posed in Pender County: if not the majority-minority rule, what 
threshold should courts use to determine when a racial group is 
entitled to a section 2 remedial district? This is a question of 
practical significance, but it is one that cannot be answered in 
practical terms without first reckoning with politics on the 
ground—the composite of practices that have evolved from the 
Supreme Court’s ballot-box jurisprudence and have yielded a 
coalitional, interest-group style of politics. Section 2’s purpose 
is to provide protection for racial and language minorities who 
are effectively locked out from this system because racially po-
larized voting prevents the formation of electoral coalitions. 
Pender County undercuts section 2’s protection by imposing ad-
ditional hurdles to the formation of multi-racial electoral coali-
tions even where the effects of racially polarized voting can be 
contained.  
 
 91. Smith, supra note 32, at 291. 
